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An invesigation of response bias in the Chapman Scales (76 
PP- )
This study examined response s problems associated with 
four of the Chapman scales, which reportedly measure per­
sonality traits of individuals considered to be prone to 
psychosis. Evidence suggested that interpretations of the 
Chapman scales were confounded by response set biases, and 
that the Chapman scales have been simply measuring, to a 
considerable extent, the tendency of subjects to give 
socially desirable responses in self-description. Revised 
normative data for the Edwards and Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scales indicated that social desirability norms 
are less rigorous than they were twenty years ago. Multiple 
regression and correlation techniques indicated socially 
desirable and acquiescent response styles may account for 
25$ of the total variance in the Perceptual Aberration, 
Magical Ideation, and Impulsive Nonconformity Scales. How­
ever, no reliable response set predictors were identified 
for the Physical Anhedonia Scale. Results demonstrated that 
normal subjects were able to identify the keyed responses on 
each of these selected Chapman scales, and successfully fake 
their scores.
Director: James A. Walsh, Ph.D.
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An investigation o£ Response Bias in the chapman scales
It has long been observed that scores on personality 
questionnaires are influenced by factors other that the 
manifest content of the items. Simply because an individual 
responds "false” to the item, "I often think about things 
too bad to talk about,” it cannot be determined whether this 
person's thoughts would not be upsetting to others, whether 
bad thoughts are experienced but the individual refuses for 
any number of reasons to divulge that information, or 
whether the individual is generally disposed to disagree 
with most personality test items regardless of their con­
tent. Conversely, a "true” response to this item would not 
rule out possibility that the respondent was displaying a 
tendency to agree with most personality statements irre­
spective of their content.
The omnipresence of this problem - that responses to 
personality test items cannot always be taken at face value 
- has been a considerable source of frustration to psycho­
logists in their quests for accurate assessments, devel­
oping successful treatment applications, and further under­
standing of the human experience. While psychologists are 
advised to attempt to elicit the client's or subject's full 
cooperation before beginning a test, there are additional 
factors operating that must be considered when Interpreting 
responses to items on a personality questionnaire.
What, then, are the sources of variance in personality
1
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tests? In searching for the answer to this question, the 
concept of response set was introduced, incorporating the 
idea that subjects bring sets, or habitual response pre­
ferences, to the testing situation. These include the 
tendency to indiscriminantly agree with personality state­
ments, and the tendency to describe oneself in favorable, 
socially desirable terms, either as a result of a general
learning set, or in order to achieve the approval of
others.
The development of the Minnesota Multiphasic Person­
ality Inventory capitalized on the growing awareness of the
response bias problem. In the construction of the MMPI,
three special validity scales (F, L, and K) were incorpor­
ated to detect and, in the case of the K scale, to sup­
press, defensive or Hfake good” tendencies. The F, L, and K 
validity Indicators, as well as other indices, attempted to 
detect any inappropriate response sets that might be util­
ized by the test-taker. (These scales will be described in 
detail below). For example, a person with limited reading 
ability may complete a given questionnaire very quickly, 
which would arouse legitimate concern about the authenti­
city of the item endorsements. Another possibility is that 
a person may be unable or unwilling to take the test, but 
instead of refusing directly to complete it, they may 
endorse all items ”true" or "false,” or alternate "true" and
Response Bias
3
"false" responses. The validity scales of the MMPI attempt 
to identify and correct these response set problems. These 
problems must be adequately addressed with any personality 
inventory before reasonable interpretations of the scales 
can be m a d e .
Problems associated with response biases are particu­
larly devastating to the validity of personality scales that 
are rationally constructed (Edwards, 1970). Before attemp­
ting to measure individual differences with respect to some 
personality construct, it is necessary to demonstrate con­
vergent and discriminant validity for the scale being used. 
Yet, for rational scales there seldom exists an external 
criterion that can be regarded as accurately measuring the 
trait which the rational scale is designed to measure. 
Instead, rational scales are ordinarily validated by hypo­
thesis testing and experimentation.
Therefore, it is extremely Important to develop person­
ality scales that are relatively free from response biases 
to ensure that the scale is not simply measuring personal 
sets to respond to content-irrelevant aspects of the test. 
The major response sets that Interfere with the interpreta­
tion of personality scales are described below.
Edwards Social Desirability Response Set
Edwards discussed the acquisition of the social 
desirability (SD) response set in terms of social rein-
Response Bias
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forcement for "learning cultural norms of what is desirable 
and undesirable in the way of personality traits and char­
acteristics" (Edwards, 1970, p. 224). In every society an 
effort is made to teach children those standards of conduct 
that society considers "good" and "bad," or socially desir­
able and undesirable. Children are rewarded for acts that 
are considered to be desirable, and punished for those that 
are considered undesirable. It seems reasonable to assume 
that by early adolescence, if not before, almost all 
children have acquired a fairly good understanding of what 
is socially desirable and undesirable within the context of 
their particular culture.
Operationalizing this view, Edwards viewed an SD 
response as a "true" response to an item where a panel of 
subjects has judged it to be socially desirable to say 
"true," or a "false" response to an item to which it has 
been judged socially undesirable (SUD) to say "true."
If one considers the population of statements that 
might be used in describing personality, each statement can 
be characterized in terms of its position on a single 
dimension of social desirability-undesirability, or, more 
briefly, social desirability. It is possible to obtain a 
scale value for any personality statement such that the 
scale value indicates the position of the statement on the 
social deslrabiltiy continuum, relative to other statements.
Response Bias
5
Regardless of the multidimensional nature of personality 
statements with respect to content, it is nonetheless pos­
sible to describe each one in terms of its position on the 
social desirability dimension. According to Edwards, the 
social desirability continuum appears to be the most impor­
tant single dimension on which to locate personality state­
ments by virtue of the fact that if we know the position of 
a statement on it, we can then predict, with a high degree 
of accuracy, the proportion of individuals who will say, in 
self-description, that the statement decribes them (Edwards, 
1957).
Thus, the social desirability scale value (SDSV) of a 
personality statement refers to its location on the con­
tinuum of social desirability as determined by one of the 
various psychological scaling methods. High SDSVs repre­
sent statements that are judged as highly socially desir­
able, and low SDSVs represent statements that are judged as 
socially undesirable, with reference to an arbitrary origin 
of average social desirability. The relationship between 
the social desirability scale value of a personality state­
ment and the probability that this statement will be 
endorsed by subjects when they are asked to describe their 
own personalities in terms of the statement will be de­
scribed next.
Suppose that a given set of personality statements has
Response Bias
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been rated for social desirability, and that the SDSVs of 
the statements are available. If this same set of state­
ments is given to another independent group of individuals, 
and they are asked to describe themselves by responding 
"true" or "false" to each statement, then it Is possible to 
obtain the proportion of "true" responses, that is, P(T) 
given to each statement. P(T) is called the probability of 
item endorsement. Then, for each item, we would have a 
value of P (T ) and a value of SDSV.
For example, a set of 140 personality statements was 
judged for social desirability by a group of 152 judges 
(Edwards, 1953). Scale values for the statements were 
obtained by the method of successive Intervals. The state­
ments were printed in inventory form, and then administered 
to a new group of 152 students. One of the statements in 
the inventory was "I like to be loyal to my friends." This 
statement had an extremely high social desirability scale 
value, and was endorsed by 98 percent of the students. 
Another statement in the inventory was "I like to avoid 
responsibilities and obligations." This statement had an 
extremely low social desirability scale value, and was 
endorsed by only 6 percent of the students. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between P(T) and SDSV for the 140 person­
ality statements.
If P (T ) is plotted against SDSV for any random or
Response Bias
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Figure 1 . Probability of endorsement of a personality 
statement as related to the social desirability scale value 
of the statement. Statements are from the Personal Prefer­
ence Schedule. Source: Edwards (1953).
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representative set of statements, it will be found that P(T) 
increases linearly with SDSV. In other words, statements
with low or socially undesirable scale values have a low
probability of being answered true, and statements with high 
or socially desirable scale values have a high probability 
of being answered true. Various studies have shown that 
P (T ) is linearly related to SDSV (Cowen & Tongas, 1959; 
Edwards & Walsh, 1963a; Hanley, 1956; Kenny, 1956; Taylor, 
1959). The linear relationship is found not only in col­
lege and adult samples, but also when young children are
asked to describe themselves. For example, the correlation 
between P(T) and SDSV has been reported by Cruse (1966) to 
increase from 0.61 for children age 3, to 0.71 for children
age 4, to .74 for children age 5, and to 0.88 for children
age 6. Additionally, there is evidence that children's 
judgments of the social desirability of personality state­
ments are highly correlated with the SDSVs of the state­
ments based on the judgements of adults. Walsh, Tomlinson-
Keasey, and Klieger (1974) demonstrated that children in the 
first grade can give ratings of SDSVs for items that correl­
ate as high as +.92 with rating by college students.
However, it would be erroneous to conclude that simply 
because an individual has learned the cultural norms of 
social desirability, he or she will necessarily behave in 
accordance with them, or describe himself or herself in
Response Bias
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terms of them. Yet, individual differences in rates of SD 
responding represent a reliable personality trait, and 
rational scales can be developed to measure this trait 
without regard to the content of the items in the scale 
other than as this content determines the SDSVs of the 
items. Thus, the social desirability response set has been
shown to be related to responses to a wide variety of
objective personality, attitude, and interest scales.
The Edwards Social Desirability sca l e .
A procedure frequently used in constructing attitude 
scales is to have a group of subjects Judge the degree of
favorableness or unfavorableness of each of a number of
attitude statements relating to some psychological con­
struct. Upon the basis of these Judgements a scale value 
is obtained for each statement by one of the psychological 
scaling methods. The scale value of a statement is taken 
as an indicator of the location of the statement on a 
psychological continuum ranging from highly unfavorable, 
through neutral, to highly favorable. There is adequate and 
ample evidence to Indicate that the scale values thus 
obtained are highly reliable and relatively independent of 
the attitudes of the Judges themselves toward the psycho­
logical construct. (Edwards, 1957).
In addition, if a scale was designed to measure a per­
sonality trait that was itself considered socially desir-
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able, then one would expect to find the SD key for the 
items in the scale to be very similar to the trait key. If 
this scale was scored by each key, the correlation between 
the two sets of scores should be quite high and positive.
Similarly, if a high score on a given personality scale
indicates the presence of a trait that would Itself be 
judged as socially undesirable, one would expect the scor­
ing keys for SD and the trait to be reversed, thus pro­
ducing a high negative correlation between the SD and trait
scores.
An initial set of 150 items was obtained from the F, L, 
K, and Anxiety scales of the MMPI (Edwards, 1957). These 
were submitted to a group of 10 judges who were asked to 
give socially desirable responses to the items. For 79 of 
the 150 items perfect agreement was found that a particular 
response was the judged socially desirable response. The 
items were later analyzed, and a set of 39 items were 
selected that showed the greatest differentiation between a 
high and low group in terms of total SD scores on the 79 
item scale. This 39 item SD scale has since been used in a 
variety of investigations (Merrill & Heathers, 1956; Welsh, 
1956; Edwards, 1961; Messick & Jackson, 1961a; Edwards, 
Diers, & Walker, 1962; Edwards & Walsh, 1963b, 1964; Block,
1965).
If the SD scale provides a measure of the tendency of
Response Bias
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subjects to give socially desirable responses to statements 
in self-description, then the correlations of scores on this 
scale with other personality scales, given under standard 
instructions, should indicate something of the extent to 
which the social desirability variable is operating. Cron- 
bach and Meehl (1955), in a discussion of the notion of 
construct validity in psychological tests, pointed out that 
if two tests are presumed to measure the same construct, a 
correlation between them can be predicted. Table 1 gives 
the correlations between the SD scale and various clinical 
and validity scales of the MMPI as obtained by Merrill and 
Heathers (1956). The group tested by these investigators 
consisted of 155 counseling center clients. Note that the
Table 1 .
Correlations between the SD scale and the MMPI scales.______
MMPI Scale Edwards SD Scale
L .14
F -.63
K .81
Hs -.52
D -.61
Hy .08
Pd -.50
Mf -.36
Pa -.09
Pt -.85
Sc -.77
Ma -.13
Source: Merrill and Heathers (1956), N = 155.
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correlation between the SD scale and the K scale is very 
h i g h .
The K scale of the MMPI consists of 30 items that were 
empirically selected to assist in identifying persons who 
displayed significant pathology, yet had profiles within the 
normal range. The objective of the K scale was to provide a 
correction for scores on certain diagnostic scales. The 
content of the items on the K scale is heterogeneous, and 
covers self-control, and family and interpersonal relation­
ships. Examples of the K scale items with the deviant 
answer indicated in parentheses are as follows:
"I like to let people know where I stand on things."
(false)
"I have very few quarrels with members of my family."
(true)
"People often disappoint me." (false)
The K-corrected profile of the MMPI was developed by 
determining the proportion of K that, when added to the raw 
score on the clinical scales, would maximize the discrim­
ination between the normative groups and the criterlons 
groups. The K scale is considered a measure of personality 
integration and healthy adjustment, with high scores 
reflecting more positive adjustment. Very high scores on 
the K scale are taken to indicate people who are consis­
tently trying to maintain a facade of adequacy and control,
Response Bias
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and are admitting no problems or weaknesses (’’faking good"). 
Presumably, individuals with high scores on the K scale have 
been somewhat defensive in answering the items in the MMPI, 
and consequently have failed to obtain as high a score on 
some of the diagnostic scales as they would have obtained if 
they had been less defensive. Low scores suggest that these 
persons are greatly exaggerating their problems to create an 
unfavorable Impression ("faking bad").
Adjustment and social desirability may not be equiva­
lent concepts. However, they are quite similar in meaning. 
One should expect, therefore, to find scores on the K scale 
highly correlated with those on the SD scale. Table 1 indi­
cates this is the case.
However, if a statement has a high SDSV, and if a 
subject endorses it in self-description, interpretation of 
this response is confounded unless it can be demonstrated 
that SD response biases are not involved. on an anxiety 
scale, for Instance, each of the items would be keyed for 
the response that supposedly indicates the presence of this 
trait, suppose that the items in the anxiety scale are 
rated for social desirability and the SDSV of each of the 
items is obtained. If upon examining the trait responses to 
the items, it is then discovered that each trait response is 
also an SUD response, we would say that the trait and the 
SUD responses to the items are completely confounded.
Response Bias
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Scores on the anxiety scale may simply reflect the tendency 
to give SD responses in self-description. Then it would 
also be possible to describe a low scoring group on the 
anxiety scale as those who desire to make a good impression 
on others, and a high scoring group as those who are less 
interested in what others think of them.
Factor anaysls and other studies of the Internal 
structure of personaliity tests give evidence that this type 
of confounding of trait and SD responses occurs frequently. 
These studies have revealed very few factors, often not more 
than two, which have been demonstrated to be associated with 
the response styles of social desirability and acquiescence. 
(Jackson, 1960; Jackson & Messick, 1961, 1962a, 1962b:
Messick & Jackson, 1961b; Edwards, 1963; Wiggins, 1962). 
It has been shown in principal-component factor analyses of 
MMPI scales that the Edwards SD scale has a high loading at 
one pole of the first MMPI factor often described as a 
psychotic factor. MMPI scales having a large proportion of 
items keyed for SD responses also tend to have relatively 
high loadings at the same pole of the first factor as the 
Edwards SD scale. MMPI scales having a large proportion of 
items keyed for SUD responses tend to have relatively high 
loadings at the opposite pole of the first factor. Thus, 
the proportion of items keyed for SD responses in the MMPI 
scales has been shown to be substantially correlated with
Response Bias
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the first factor loadings of the scales (Edwards, 1970). 
The relationship between the various clinical scales of the 
MMPI and the SD scale suggests, according to Fordyce (1956, 
p. 174), "that mental illness, in a generalized sense of the 
term, may be characterized as involving behavior which is 
socially disapproved."
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Social approval scales of the Marlowe-Crowne type have 
been shown to have low-to-moderate correlations with the 
kind of SD scales described by Edwards. The fact that both 
kinds of scales have been referred to as social desirability 
scales frequently leads to confusion.
Imagine a class of personality statements that is de­
fined by two major attributes: First, they are culturally
sanctioned things to say about oneself; and second, they are 
probably untrue of most people. A balanced scale composed 
half of culturally acceptable but probably untrue state­
ments, and half of true but undesirable statements consti­
tutes the model for the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
(M-c SD) scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964).
The Marlowe - Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was 
constructed in the following manner. Items were selected 
that met the criterion of cultural approval and yet were 
untrue of virtually all people, and that had minimal
Response Bias
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pathological Implications. A set of 50 items meeting these 
criteria was submitted to ten judges for social desirability 
ratings. The judges were Instructed to score the items in 
the socially desirable direction using true and false re­
sponse categories. Unanimous agreement was obtained on 36 
items and 90% on 11 more. These 47 items constituted the 
preliminary form of the scale.
The preliminary version of the scale was then admin­
istered to 76 students in two Introductory psychology 
classes, and an item analysis performed. There were 33 
items which discriminated between high and low total scores 
at the .05 level or better. Of the 33 items, 18 are keyed 
true and 15 false. These 33 items constitute the final form 
of the M-C SD scale.
The M-C SD scale is very similar to the Lie scale of 
the MMPI. The Lie (L) scale of the MMPI includes 15 items 
that were selected on a rational basis to identify persons 
who are deliberately trying to avoid answering the MMPI 
frankly and honestly. The L scale also assesses attitudes 
and practices that are culturally commendable, but few 
individuals could in honesty, consistently give the keyed 
responses. Content areas within the L scale Include denial 
of minor, personal dishonesties and denial of aggression, 
bad thoughts, and weakness of character. Examples of the L 
scale items with the deviant answer indicated in parentheses
Response Bias
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are as follows:
"At times I feel like swearing." (false)
"I get angry sometimes." (false)
"Sometimes when I am not feeling well I am cross." 
(false)
While there are some individuals who could give the 
false response to several items on the scale without neces­
sarily being dishonest, almost all individuals who take the 
MMPI obtain low scores on the L scale. Thus, higher scores 
are regarded as revealing something about an individual's 
tendency not to be frank.
Since "false" is the deviant answer to all L scale 
items, the L scale is extremely susceptible to unsophisti­
cated deviant test-taking sets, such as the set to blatantly 
seek social approval, or the set to answer all items "true." 
More sophisticated deviant response sets may go undetected 
by the L scale. Inspection of the L scale items reveals 
that it is readily apparent which responses are the deviant 
ones. Numerous studies have shown that the L scale does not 
detect sophisticated persons who were given instructions to 
falsify their answers to the MMPI (Dahlstrom et al., 1972; 
Vincent, Linsz, & Green, 1966). These persons apparently 
realized that it would be unconvincing to give the keyed 
responses to L scale items. Thus, the L scale can be 
construed as a measure of psychological sophistication with
Response Bias
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high scores indicating a lack of such sophistication. The 
person's education level and socioeconomic class must be 
kept in mind when interpreting the L scale.
The interpretation of socially desirable responding on 
the M-C SD scale is somewhat different. It is believed that 
people conform to social stereotypes of what is good to 
acknowledge about oneself in order to achieve approval from 
others. Individuals who depict themselves in very favor­
able terms on the M-C SD scale are considered to be dis­
playing a strong need for social approval, and thus have a 
social desirability response set in this more specific sense 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1964).
Acquiescence
Acquiescence, the tendency to mark true, indicate 
agreement, or otherwise respond uncritically to test items 
by personal endorsement, has been established as a major 
response determinant in the measurement of personality 
variables (Bass, 1955; Chapman & Campbell, 1957; Jackson & 
Messick, 1958). Couch and Keniston (1960) have in fact 
shown that "yea-saying” is widely general over different 
items and tests, and they suggest that this response set 
stems from "a central personality syndrome" (p.173).
It has long been recognized by those who have con­
structed personality scales that approximately half o£ the 
statements in the scale should be keyed in the opposite
Response Bias
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direction from the other half. in this way, one hopes to 
avoid the confounding of scores with the tendency to respond 
consistently "true" or "false" regardless of the content of 
the items.
If a majority of the items In an inventory are keyed 
"true," for example, a high score may be measuring not only 
the variable of Interest, but also the tendency of the 
subject to acquiesce, similarly, if a majority of the items 
in the scale is keyed "false," then high scores may also be 
measuring the tendency of the subject to dissent, that is, 
to generally disagree with the items in the scale. Thus, 
scores on two scales in which all of the items are keyed 
"true" might be expected to have some degree of positive 
correlation simply because of individual differences in 
acquiescent tendencies. Therefore, scores on personality 
scales are regarded as being susceptible to the influence of 
acquiescent tendencies to the degree to which there is an 
imbalance in the true-false keying of the items in the scale 
(Couch & Keniston, 1960; Frlcke, 1956; Messick & Jackson, 
1961b; Wiggins, 1959).
Imbalance of true-false keying in a given scale creates 
an additional problem in Interpreting the scale. Hanley 
(1961) pointed out that acquiescent response sets and social 
desirability response sets are often confounded this way. 
For example, if a majority of the items in a scale are keyed
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"true" and simultaneously have socially desirable (or 
undesirable) scale values, then it is difficult to isolate 
the influence of the tendency to acquiesce from that of the 
tendency to give SD (or SUD) responses. Similar considera­
tions apply to scales in which a majority of the items is 
keyed "false” and simultaneoulsy have socially desirable (or 
undesirable) scale values.
The basic method for demonstrating the presence of the 
acquiescense response set has been to show that a given 
questionnaire, say the California F Scale (Adorno et al., 
1950), has a disproportionate number of items keyed "agree" 
(or true or yes). Then the "agree" items are reversed in
direction and scored for disagreement. A correlation is 
then computed between scores on the original and reversed 
items. Failure to find a high negative correlation is taken 
as an indication of the tendency to aquiesce.
Welsh's R Scale
The R Scale of the MMPI was developed by Welsh (1956) 
as a marker variable for the second MMPI factor. It con­
sists of 40 items all of which are keyed "false." Indi­
viduals with high rates of "true" responding would obtain 
low scores on the R Scale, and individuals with low rates of 
"true" responding would obtain high scores. consequently, 
scores on the R scale have been interpreted as reflecting 
acquiescent tendencies. It has been suggested (Hanley,
Response Bias
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1961) that scales containing items with neutral SDSVs might 
be relatively Independent of the influencce of SD tenden­
cies, and therefore more susceptible to the Influence of 
acquiescent tendencies. While the SDSVs of the items on 
the R Scale are not all neutral, they are distributed fairly 
well over the social desirability continuum, and the scale 
has a fair degree of balance in its SD-SUD keying (Edwards, 
1964). Additionally, the R Scale tends to have a low cor­
relation with the Edwards SD Scale, a low loading on the 
first MMPI factor, and a high loading on the second factor. 
Furthermore, the factor loadings of MMPI scales on the 
second factor are substantially correlated (r = 0 . 8 2 )  with 
the proportion of items keyed "true" in the scales, whereas 
the correlation between the second factor loadings and the 
proportion of items keyed for SD responses is relatively low 
(r = -0.38). This evidence suggests that the second MMPI 
factor is reflecting acquiescent tendencies (Edwards, 1970). 
Infrequency
Infrequency scales are used to detect unusual or atyp­
ical ways of answering the test items. A familiar example 
of this type of scale is the F scale of the MMPI. Unlike 
most of the other MMPI scales, the F scale was not derived 
by comparing item endorsements between criterion and normal 
groups. It consists of 64 items that no more than 10 
percent of an early subsample of the MMPI normative sample
Response Bias
22
answered in the deviant direction, and therefore is often 
referred to as the frequency (or Infrequency) scale of the 
MMPI. The scale taps a wide variety of content areas, 
including bizarre sensations, strange thoughts, peculiar 
experiences, feelings of isolation and alienation, and a 
number of unlikely or contradictory beliefs and self­
descriptions (Greene, 1980). Examples of F scale items with 
the deviant answer indicated in parentheses are as follows: 
"When I am with people, I am bothered by hearing very 
queer things." (true)
"No one cares much what happens to you." (true)
"I believe in law enforcement." (false)
High scores on the F Scale may be obtained by answering 
the items without reading them carefully, (thus raising con­
cern about the validity of the profile). They may also be 
obtained by persons experiencing severe psychological dis­
tress. However, since the content of the F scale items is 
obvious, individuals may lower or raise their F scale scores 
virtually as desired. Therefore, another possible interpre­
tation of high scores on this scale is that the individuals 
are intentionally wishing to call attention to themselves by 
giving many unusual and improbable responses.
Jackson Infrequency Scale.
The 20 item Jackson Infrequency Scale, items for which 
are similar to items on the F scale, can be used in con­
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junction with other scales to identify careless, nonpur­
poseful, invalid responding (Sechrest & Jackson, 1963). 
Writing items for the scale again involved identifying 
facets of behavior that are so common or so uncommon in the 
general population that a purposeful keyed response in the 
infrequent direction would be exceptionally rare. It dif­
fers from the F Scale in that items too extreme in desir­
ability, or too bizarre or ludicrous, were eliminated. 
Items whose content reflected statistical deviancy, yet were 
neither bizarre nor particularly undesirable (i.e. "I 
learned to repair watches is Switzerland.") were retained. 
A set of 165 items showing little content homogeneity, apart 
from representing infrequently endorsed content, was item 
analyzed by correlating each item with the total score, with 
each of several content scales from the Personality Research 
Inventory (Jackson, 1976), and with a social desirability 
scale, items were retained which correlated higher with the 
Infrequency Scale than with any of the other scales. This 
analysis eliminated items which reflected a predominance of 
desirability variance, and items that correlated inappro­
priately with irrelevant scales. Of the original 165 items, 
40 survived this procedure, were balanced with respect to 
"true" and "false" responses, and assigned to parallel forms 
by computer, yielding two scales of 20 items length with 
virtually identical statistical properties (Jackson, 1976).
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These infrequency items, although diverse in content, elicit 
reliable responses and are highly sensitive to certain types 
of invalid responding. 
impression Management or "Faking”
In their discussion of the K scale, Meehl and Hathaway
(1946) have observed that one of the most important defects
of personality scales is their susceptibility to "faking," 
that is, to motivation on the part of some individuals to 
create either a favorable or unfavorable impression of them­
selves. Faking refers to a conscious and intentional falsi­
fication of responses to personality items.
A person’s needs may dispose him or her to present 
himself or herself in a particular light in a testing situ­
ation. If it is important for the individual to gain
approval or acceptance, to deny inadequacies, or to achieve 
recognition or status, one may anticipate that his or her 
test responses will be altered to serve these aims. As 
Rotter (1960) put it, "What we call faking is only our
recognition of the fact that the subject is taking the test 
with a different purpose or goal than the one the experi­
menter wants him to have" (p.308).
Faking good refers to the attempt to create a favorable 
impression by falsifying responses to personality items. If 
an individual attempts to fake good and is successful, then 
we may expect him or her to obtain a higher score on a scale
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than he or she otherwise would, provided the trait being 
measured by the scale is a socially desirable one. On a 
scale measuring a socially undesirable trait, a successful 
attempt to fake good should result in a lower score than 
would otherwise be obtained by the individual.
Faking bad, on the other hand, refers to motivation to 
create an unfavorable impression. Thus the influence of 
faking bad on personality scales should be just the opposite 
of faking good. Faking bad may occur in situations where an 
individual is under the impression that portraying himself 
in terms of socially undesirable characteristics may work to 
his advantage. To fake bad in some situations may be of 
importance, but it does not seem that this form of impres­
sion management would be as prevalent as that to fake good.
The procedure frequently used in studies of faking is 
to have subjects take an inventory under standard instruc­
tions for self-description, and then to Obtain a second 
record from the same subjects under special instructions to 
fake, that is, asking the subjects to create a favorable or 
unfavorable Impression. General instructions to fake good 
on an inventory containing many scales cannot be expected to 
have much Influence on items with extreme SDSVs. If an item 
has a high SDSV, then the proportion of individuals answer­
ing "true" to the item under standard instructions will also 
be quite high, and at best this proportion can, under the
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special instructions, be increased only slightly. The same 
considerations apply to items with low SDSVs where the 
proportion o£ ’'false" responses under standard instructions 
is high.
For neutral items, and items with moderately desirable 
and undesirable scale values, the proportion of individuals 
answering "true" or "false" to items under standard in­
structions tends to be more evenly balanced. Therefore, 
for items of this kind there exists a greater possibility of 
large shifts in the proportion answering "true" or "false" 
under specific instructions to fake good. However, there 
are individual differences in the judged desirablility of 
items. Such individual differences will not result in a 
uniform shift in a consistent direction on the part of all 
individuals responding to the items under special instruc­
tions to fake good. It seems reasonable to assume that 
under standard instructions subjects will differ in their 
tendencies to respond to items in personality inventories in 
terms of social desirability. If a subject's responses 
under standard instructions are already primarily influ­
enced by considerations of social desirability, special 
instructions to attend to social desirability should not 
result in any marked shifts in his responses. On the other 
hand, subjects whose initial responses to the items under 
standard instructions were relatively mildly influenced by
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social desirability considerations might be expected to show 
marked shifts in their responses under the special instruc­
tions. Faking good on personality inventories, without 
special instructions to do so, should be considered equiva­
lent to the tendency to give socially desirable responses in 
self-description. It is this tendency that the SD scale was 
designed to measure.
To the degree to which individuals can accurately judge 
the SDSVs of the items, and to the degree to which there is 
an imbalance in the SD-SUD keying of the items in the vari­
ous scales included in an inventory, the mean scores on the 
scales may be expected to change under specific instruc­
tions to fake good. For example, if all of the items in a 
scale in an inventory are keyed for trait and SD responses, 
then all individuals who accurately judge the SDSVs of the 
items, and in turn give the SD responses to the items, 
should obtain a score under special Instructions that is 
equal to the number of items in the scale. As a result, the 
mean score on the scale should be increased. But if the 
scale contains a considerable number of items with neutral 
or moderately desirable or undesirable scale values, then 
the shift in the mean score under special instructions to 
fake good may not be a great as would be the case if the 
items were more extreme in their SDSVs. If a scale contains 
a balance in its SD-SUD keying, then instructions to fake
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good should result in a mean score on the scale that is 
approximately equal to one-half the number of items in the 
s c a l e .
There is no way in which to differentiate between those 
Individuals who obtain high (or low) scores on personality 
scales designed to measure specific traits because of im­
pression management, and those who obtain high (or low) 
scores because they have accurately described themselves. 
One could take the extreme position, as does Edwards, and 
regard scores on any scale as simply resulting from indi­
vidual differences in motivation toward impression manage­
ment with respect to the particular trait being measured by 
the scale. When one considers some of the factors involved 
in successful impression management, it is difficult to 
believe that reliable individual differences in scores on 
trait scales could simply result from reliable individual 
differences in impression management. The individual
motivated toward impression management must consider the 
impression he wishes to create, the possible traits measured 
by the various scales in the inventory, the particular items 
included in these scales, and the keyed responses to these 
items. In addition, if he believes that either extremely 
high or low scores on a scale are to be avoided, but that a 
score slightly above or below average is desirable, then he 
must also attempt to guess the mean score on the scale. The
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problems that individuals motivated toward impression man­
agement must face in responding to items in personality 
inventories are not inconsiderable if they are to be sucess- 
ful. To consider individual scores on a personality scale 
simply as a result of individual differences in impression 
management does not seem reasonable.
To summarize thus far, the major response sets adverse­
ly affecting the validity and usefulness of trait scales can 
be referred to as Edwards social desirability, Marlowe- 
Crowne social desirability, acquiescence, random responding, 
and impression management.
Introduction to the Chapman Scales
Researchers investigating the etiology of schizophrenia 
often use subjects who are considered to be at risk for the 
illness but who have not yet developed the disorder. If 
these high risk subjects could be identified more reliably 
than is now possible, the progress of such research would be 
facilitated. Because the genetic transmission of a predis­
position to this disorder has been established, the rela­
tives of those having the illness have been used as high 
risk subjects. However, most relatives never develop these 
disorders. Thus, methods for identifying high risk subjects 
within the general population are needed to permit the study 
of such persons prior to the onset of illness or, at least, 
much earlier in its course.
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Chapman et al. (1976, 1978, 1983, 1984) have reported
the construction and validation of numerous self-report 
Inventories designed to measure personality traits thought 
to be associated with predisposing factors to schizophrenia. 
The Chapman scales that are receiving the most acceptance 
and application are the following: Physical Anhedonla,
Perceptual Aberration, Magical Ideation, and Impulsive 
Nonconformity. While Chapman claims that in the development 
of these scales the "potential artifacts of social desir­
ability, acquiescence, and random responding were ruled 
out," (1976, p. 374) close Inspection of the methods of con­
struction and Item content strongly suggests that the prob­
lems of response biases were not adequately addressed in the 
development of the scales. A number of examples serve to 
illustrate this point.
First, Chapman et al., in developing this series of 
scales, did not use instruments designed to measure the 
various response biases in a consistent fashion. For in­
stance, a different scale was used to measure acquiescence 
in each study, making comparisons difficult. Two of the 
scales used, one measuring acquiescence and the other 
infrequency, were, in fact, experimental scales (Chapman et 
al., 1976, 1983).
second, when addressing acquiescence on both the 
Perceptual Aberration and Impulsive Nonconformity scales,
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Chapman dismisses the problem of this response set by 
stating, "The number of items was not balanced because the 
statement of the absence of a trait could often be achieved 
only by inserting a "not" or "never" or some other negative 
creating a double negative which was likely to be confusing" 
(1984, p. 683).
Third, in developing the Physical Anhedonia Scale, 
Chapman simply remarks that, "an attempt was made to avoid 
items with a bias toward social desirability" (1978, p. 376) 
and then neglects to report a correlation with any social 
desirability scale.
Finally, and most importantly, while Chapman et al. 
(1976, 1978, 1983, 1984) address the possibility of Marlowe- 
Crowne social desirability response bias in their descrip­
tion of their scales, they neglect to deal with the prob­
lems associated with Edwards social desirability which, as 
we have seen, is the major source of response bias in 
personality measurement.
To repeat, it is necessary to have a scale as unbiased 
as possible with regard to SD, and certain precautions are 
mandatory. Many scales, bearing a number of different 
labels, are interpretable in terms of response biases. 
These scales often intercorrelate much too highly at the 
expense of efficency of assessment and convergent and 
discriminant validity, in light of the evidence for the
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massive effects of such general sources of bias as desira­
bility and acquiescence, it Is mandatory to incorporate 
methods of control in the development of personality scales. 
If a test is designed with the hope of measuring the trait 
of concern accurately, response biases cannot be permitted 
to run rampant.
If we wish to distinguish between the traits of per­
ceptual abberation, magical ideation, impulsive noncom- 
formity, and physical anhedonia, then it is necessary to 
develop scales which are relatively uncorrelated with 
scores on SD scales. There is no good reason why psycho­
logists and other research workers should continue to 
develop new personality scales, and to assign different 
trait names to these scales, only to find that scores on the 
various scales are highly correlated with individual dif­
ferences in rates of SD responding. Of much greater impor­
tance and significance would be the development of scales 
with sound psychometric properties on which scores are rel­
atively uncorrelated with rates of SD responding.
The purpose of this investigation was to determine the 
amount of variance in the Chapman scales that could be 
attributed to response bias. The contention being advanced 
is that the Chapman scales are simply measuring, to a con­
siderable extent, the tendency of subjects to give socially 
desirable responses in self-description. In this study, the
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Chapman scales were re-examined for possible response biases 
in a systematic fashion using established instruments. 
Current normative data was gathered for the Edwards and 
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scales, Welsh's R Scale, 
and Jackson's Infrequency Scale, as well as information on 
the ability of subjects to fake their responses on the 
chapman scales.
Method
Subjects
Subjects (N = 228) were randomly selected from male and 
female college students who completed the Chapman scales 
(Perceptual Aberration, Magical Ideation, Physical Anhedon­
ia, and Impulsive Nonconformity Scales) as part of a gener­
al screening in the 110 Introduction to Psychology course at 
the University of Montana. Subjects received credit for 
participating in a psychological experiment as a supplement 
to their required coursework in Psychology 110.
Procedures
Subjects first completed the Chapman scales during the 
regularly scheduled class period. Subjects subsequently 
arranged to complete the Edwards and Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scales, Welsh's R Scale, and Jackson's Infre­
quency Scale with the experimenter. At that time they were 
also randomly assigned to fake either good or bad on the 
Chapman scales. The faking procedure was done according to 
standard instructions used in studies investigating impres­
sion management. (See Appendix E).
Data analysis consisted of multiple regression and 
correlation techniques designed to determine the amount of 
variance in the Chapman scales that could be attributed to 
response sets, and to random responding. Additionally, 
measures of central tendency were calculated for the Edwards 
and Marlowe-crowne social desirability scales, Welsh's R
34
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Scale, and Jackson's Infrequency Scale, and t-tests were 
performed to determine if subjects were able to accurately 
identify the keyed responses on the Chapman scales, and 
therefore increase or decrease their scores on these scales 
as desired.
Results
Correlational Analysis
A total o£ 228 subjects (139 women, 89 men) partici­
pated In the study. The means and standard deviations were 
computed for the Edwards and Marlowe-Crowne social desira­
bility scales, Welsh's R Scale, and Jackson's Infrequency 
Scale, and are presented in Table 2. The means and standard 
deviations obtained by the original investigators (Edwards, 
1963; Marlowe & Crowne, 1964; Welsh, 1956; Jackson, 1967) 
are given in parentheses.
Table 2.
Current and past normative data for the Edwards (ESD) and 
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability (MCSD) scales, Welsh's R 
Scale (WR). and Jackson's Infrequency Scale (JI).____________
Scale Mean St. Dev. No. Items
ESD: Males 26.66 (32.39) 5.53 (5.20) 39
Females 25.65 4.37
MCSD: Males 12.55 (15.06) 4.62 (5.58) 33
Females 12.97 (16.82) 4.74 (5.50)
WR: Males 14.72 (14.95) 4.29 (5.03) 40
Females 15.68 (15.59) 3.68 (4.51)
J I : Males 0.29 (0.69) 0.55 (1.09) 20
Females 0.27 (0.53) 0.53 (0.79)
Males (N = 139)
Females (N = 89)
1. Mean of combined male and female sample.
2. Prorated on the basis of partial norms.
The mean scores for both men and women on the Edwards' 
SD Scale were significantly lower (t(426) = -10.99, £  < .005 
and t(426) = -14.56, £  < .005, respectively) than the values 
obtained by Edwards (1963). The mean scores on the Marlowe-
36
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Crowne SD Scale were significantly lower than the values 
obtained by Marlowe and Crowne (1964) for both men and women 
(t(892) = -9.08, £  < .005 and t(978) = -11.77, £  < .005,
respectively). The mean scores on Jackson's Infrequency 
Scale were also significantly lower than the original values 
obtained by Jackson (1967) for men and women (t(1257) = 
-5.25, £  < .005 and t(1228) = -3.44, £  < .005, respec­
tively) .
Scores for the above response set measures ranged as 
follows: the Edwards Social Desirability Scale ranged from 
10 to 36, the Marlowe-crowne Social Desirability Scale 
ranged from 1 to 27, the Welsh's R Scale ranged from 5 to 
27, and Jackson's Infrequency Scale ranged from 0 to 2.
Table 3 presents the Pearson product-moment correla­
tions among the response set measures.
Table 3 .
Correlations between the Edwards and Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scales, Welsh's R Scale, and Jackson's
Infrequency Scale.____________________________________________________
Edwards SD M-C SD Welsh's R
M-C SD .24
Welsh's R .12 .18
Jackson's Inf. -.15 .11 -.20_____
The means and standard deviations for scores on the
Chapman scales given under standard instructions are
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displayed in Table 4, and can be compared to the means and 
standard deviations obtained by Chapman et al. (1976, 1978, 
1983, 1984) for college populations by looking at the values 
in parentheses. (Standard deviations for the Impulsive
Nonconformity Scale were not provided by Chapman (1984) in 
his description of the scale). Scores on the Perceptual
Abberation Scale ranged from 0 to 32 with higher scores
indicating the experience of more frequent unusual percep­
tions. Scores on the Magical Ideation Scale ranged from 1 
to 26 with higher scores suggesting a stronger belief in 
magical influences. Physical Anhedonia scores ranged from 1
Table 4 .
Means and Standard Deviations for the Perceptual Aberration 
Scale (Per. Ab.), the Magical Ideation Scale (Mag. Id.), the 
Physical Anhedonia Scale (Phy. An.), and the Impulsive
Nonconformity Scale (Imp. Non.) under Standard Instructions.
Values in Darentheses are from ChaDman's Original reports.
Scale Mean St. Dev. No.Items
Per. Ab.: Males 6.19 (5.97) 5.62 (5.80) 35
Females 8.47 (7.35) 6.17 (6.60)
Combined 7.58 6.05
Mag. Id.: Males 9.84 (8.56) 5.43 (5.24) 30
Females 12.08 (9.69) 5.57 (5.93)
Combined 11.21 5.61
P h y . A n .: Males 13.46 (7.00) 6.70 (3.90) 61
Females 9.95 (5.60) 5.62 (3.50)
Combined 11.32 6.29
Imp. N o n . : Males 16.73 (16.83) 8.99 51
Females 14.93 (12.24) 7.47
Combined 15.63 8.13
Males (N * 89) 
Females (N = 139)
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to 37, higher scores indicating an absence of positive phys­
ical sensations. Scores ranging from 0 to 43 were obtained 
from responses to the Impulsive Nonconformity Scale, higher 
scores suggesting impulsive, defiant behavior. The above 
ranges were sufficiently large to assume adequate variabil­
ity on these measures for the purposes of the proposed 
analysis.
The means obtained for the Magical Ideation Scale for 
both men and women were significantly higher (t(771) =
-4.95, &  < .005 and t(967) = -8.83, a  < .005, respectively)
than those reported by chapman (1984) and his colleagues. 
The means for the Physical Anhedonia Scale for both men and 
women were also significantly higher (t(429) = -27.4, a  <
.005 and t(402) = -20.6, a  < -005, respectively) than those 
reported by Chapman et al.
There were basically six observations that were anoma­
lies with respect to the entire set of data, some were 
specific to a single scale because of an extreme score on 
the scale, while others were outliers with respect to two 
or more of the measures. In each case, the corresponding 
extreme scores were deleted for computing correlations with 
scores from the Chapman scales, and for the multiple regres­
sion analysis for each of the chapman scales (presented 
below) to obtain a more realistic impression of the findings 
(Snedecor & Cochran, 1983). Thus, the correlations in Table
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5 between each of the Chapman scales are presented as aver­
age correlations. The reader is referred to Appendix G for 
the actual correlations resulting from omitting observa­
tions from each set of data. Table 6 gives the correla­
tions between the response scale measures and each of the 
Chapman scales.
Table 5 .
Average Correlations between the Perceptual Abberation Scale 
(Per. Ab.), the Magical Ideation Scale (Mag. Id.), the 
Physical Anhedonia Scale (Phy. An.), and the Impulsive 
Nonconformity Scale
(Imp. N o n . ).
P e r . Ab. M a q . I d . Phy. An.
Mag. Id. .683 
Phy. An. -.171 
Imp. Non. .354
-.173
.353 .226
(N approximately 225)
Table 6.
Correlations between the Chapman 
Measures.
Scales and the Response Set
Edward's SD M-C SD Welsh's R Jackson's Inf.
Per. Ab. -.359 -.067 
Mag. Id. -.428 -.081 
Phy. An. -.118 -.083 
Imp. Non. -.382 -.098
-.193
-.292
.038
-.300
.279
.242
.110
.195
(N = 228)
Multiple Regression Analysis
To further assess the influence of response sets on the
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Chapman scales, a stepwise multiple regression analysis was 
performed for each of the four Chapman scales using scores 
on the four response set measures as predictor variables. 
Values of P to enter and remove a variable were 4.0 and 2.0, 
respectively. These correspond approximately to the .01 and 
.05 levels of significance. For the regression analysis, 
subjects were divided into two groups: an original sample
consisting of 150 subjects (90 females and 60 males), and a 
cross validation sample consisting of 78 subjects (49 fe­
males and 29 males). The analysis of the original sample 
will be discribed first.
Table 7 presents the results of the stepwise regression 
analyses describing those variables that contributed signif­
icantly to the prediction of each of the Chapman scales. 
For the Perceptual Abberation Scale, the two strongest pre­
dictors were the Edwards Social Desirability Scale and 
Jackson's infrequency Scale, which together accounted for 
17.6 percent of the total variance (F(2,142) = 8.76, p. <
.0005).
The strongest predictors for the Magical Ideation Scale 
were the Edwards Social Desirability Scale and Welsh's R 
Scale, which in combination accounted for 25.1 percent of 
the total variance (F(2,140) = 13.04, £  < .0005).
For the Physical Anhedonia, no reliable predictors were 
Identified by the stepwise procedure. The four response set
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Table 7.
Prediction of Chapman Scales from Response Set Measures- 
Stepwlse Regression Analysis.______________________________________
Scale Predictors
% of Variance/ 
each Dredictor Rear. Weiaht Cond.t*
Per. Ab. ESD 17.6/12.9 -.37 -4.13
JI and 4 .7 2.58 2.86
Mag. Id. ESD 25.1/18.4 -.47 -5.61
WR and 6 .7 -.39 -3.59
Imp. Non ESD 22.4/14.6 -.58 -4.98
WR and 7.8 -.57 -3.80
Phy. An. JI 2.1/ 1.2 1.79 NS
ESD - -.06 NS
MCSD - -.07 NS
WR .13 NS
* df. = approximately 220, £ < *01
measures together accounted for only 2.1 percent of the 
total variance (F(4,141) = .76, £  > .05), indicating that 
individuals were not responding to items on this scale in 
terms of response sets.
For the Impulsive Nonconformity Scale, the two
strongest predictors were again Edwards Social Desirability 
Scale and Welsh's R Scale which together accounted for 22.4
percent of the total variance (F(2,141) = 10,55, £  < .0005).
Cross Validation
Cross validation of the regression equations for each
of the Chapman scales resulted in considerable shrinkage in 
the amount of variance accounted for by the identified
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response set predictor variables. For the Perceptual 
Abberation Scale, the percentage of predictable variance 
decreased from 17.6 percent to 2.8 percent; for the Magical 
Ideation Scale, from 25.1 percent to 12.2 percent; and for 
the Impulsive Nonconformity Scale, from 22.4 percent to 9.3 
percent. This amount of shrinkage was much greater than 
would generally be expected from the cross validation 
procedure.
Consequently, Norman's double-split cross validation 
procedure was used to further assess whether the sample was 
atypical, or whether the relationships identified by the 
regression equations were unstable. Subjects were divided 
into two groups, Sample A and Sample B. For both samples (N 
= 114), stepwise regressions were performed for each of the 
Chapman scales on the four response set measures, and the 
alternate sample served as the cross validation sample. As 
can be seen from the data In Table 8, the procedure resulted 
in the selection of different variables as predictors for 
the two samples, and again the shrinkage was larger than 
expected, in two cases alarmingly great.
Analysis of Faking
To Investigate the ability of subjects to fake their 
responses on the Chapman scales, all subjects were randomly 
assigned to either fake good or to fake bad on the Percep­
tual Abberation, Magical Ideation, Physical Anhedonia, and
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Impulsive Nonconformity Scales. The number of subjects 
instructed to fake good was 115, the number who faked bad 
was 113. The means and standard deviations for scores faked 
in both directions are presented in Table 9.
In comparing the means from the faking and standard 
Instructions we find that, on the Perceptual Abberation
Table 8.
Double-Split Cross Validation of Stepwise Regression of the 
Chapman Scales on the Response Set Measures__________________
Sample A
Identified
Predictors
% of Variance 
in Sample A
% of Variance 
in Sample B
Per. Ab. ESD, JI, WR 23.4 3.3
Mag. Id. ESD, WR 21.6 15.7
Imp. Non. ESD, WR 23.0 13.5
Identified % of Variance % of Variance
Sample B Predictors in Sample B in Sample A
Per. Ab. ESD 18.9 9.1
Mag. Id. ESD 18.3 9.8
Imp. Non. MCSD, WR, ESD 21.3 2.6
df = approximately 220, p. <
scale, subject's in the fake good condition were able to 
lower the average score 1.8 points (0.31 standard 
deviations) from their scores obtained under standard 
instructions (t(114) = 2.95, £  < .01). Subjects in the
fake bad condition were able to raise the average score 18.3 
points (3.02 standard deviations) from their scores 
obtained under standard instructions (t(112) = -15.92, £  <
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.0001). The asymmetry in the amounts lowered and raised, 
respectively, are o£ course related to the skewness of the 
original distribution.
On the Magical Ideation Scale, subjects in the fake 
good condition were able to lower the average score 5.2
Table 9 .
Means and Standard Deviations for the Chapman Scales under 
Faking Instructions.___________________________________________
Fake Good Fake Bad
Scale Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Per. Ab. 5.77 7.38 25.87 10.27
Mag. Id. 6.00 5.51 24.61 6.83
Phy. An. 8.72 10.36 48.23 18.91
Imp. Non. 12.23 10.18 43.11 11.62
Fake good (N = 115)
Fake bad (N = 113)
f
points (0.93 standard deviations) from their scores obtained 
under standard instructions (t(114) = 10.51, £  < .0001).
Subjects in the fake bad condition were able to raise the 
average score 13.4 points (2.39 standard deviations) from 
their scores obtained under standard instructions (t(113) = 
-15.99, £  < .0001). As above, asymmetry accounts for the 
differential shift in scores.
On the Physical Anhedonia Scale, subjects in the fake 
good condition were able to lower the average score 2.6 
points (0.41 standard deviations) from their scores obtained
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under standard Instructions (t(114) - 2.44, £  < .01).
Subjects in the fake bad condition were able to raise the 
average score 36.9 points (5.87 standard deviations) from 
their scores obtained under standard Instructions (t(113) = 
-19.51, £  < .0001). As above, the skewness of the original
distribution accounts for the asymmetry.
On the Impulsive Nonconformity Scale, subjects in the 
fake good condition were able to lower the'average score 3.4 
points (0.42 standard deviations) from their scores obtained 
under standard instructions (t(114) * 4.69, £ <  .0001).
Finally, subjects in the fake bad condition were able to 
raise the average score 27.5 points (3.38 standard devia­
tions) from their scores obtained under standard instruc­
tions (t(113) = -19.17, £  < .0001). Again, asymmetry
account for the differential shifts.
When instructed to fake good, the ranges of scores on 
the Chapman scales were quite wide. Scores on the Percep­
tual Abberation Scale ranged from 0 to 35. Scores on the 
Magical Ideation Scale ranged from 0 to 30. Physical Anhe- 
donia scores ranged from 0 to 60. Scores ranging from 0 to 
50 were obtained on the Impulsive Nonconformity Scale.
Under fake bad instructions, scores on the Perceptual 
Abberation, Magical Ideation, Physical Anhedonia, and 
impulsive Nonconformity Scales ranged from 0 to 35, 3 to 30, 
1 to 61, and 7 to 51, respectively. Note that the score
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ranges for both fake good and fake bad conditions indicate 
that some individuals obtained a maximum or minimum score in 
the wrong direction, that is, completely reversed the faking 
task. Even when including such subjects in the analysis, 
the shifts in the mean scores under faking instructions were 
always significant.
We were interested to see if those individuals identi­
fied as being psychosis prone, using chapman's criteria, 
were able to effectively fake their responses on the Chapman 
scales. Persons scoring more than two standard deviations 
above the mean on either the Perceptual Abberation Scale or 
the Magical Ideation Scale, or scoring greater than three 
standard deviations above the mean on the combined Percep­
tual Aberration - Magical Ideation Scale, are identified by 
Chapman (1983) et al. as "Per-Mags,” (i.e. psychosis prone) 
Using this criterion, 14 subjects from our sample were 
identified as Per-Mags.
The number of Per-Mags instructed to fake good was 8, 
the number who faked bad was 6. The means and standard 
deviations for scores faked in both directions by these 
individuals are presented in Table 10. In comparing the 
means from the faking and standard instructions we find 
that, when faking good on the Perceptual Abberation and 
Magical Ideation Scales, Per-Mags were able to lower their 
average score 2.07 and 2.34 standard deviations, respec-
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Table 1 0 .
Means and Standard Deviations for Per-Mags on the Chapman 
Scales under Faking Instructions._________________________________
Fake Good Fake Bad
scale Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Per. Ab. 
Mag. Id. 
Phy. An. 
Imp. Non.
8.25*
12.88*
7.00
16.12
7.13
7.41
3.74
8.46
28.50
25.17
49.33**
43.50*
6.06
4.75
21,97
9.72
Fake good (N = 8), fake bad (N = 6)
* p  < .05
** p  < .01
tively. When faking bad on the Physical Anhedonia and 
Impulsive Nonconformity Scales, Per-Mags were able to raise 
their average score by 6.71 and 2.62 standard deviations, 
respectively. The probabilities for t-tests of these mean 
differences are indicated in Table 10 by means of asterisks.
The correlations for the Per-Mag group between the 
Chapman scales and the response set measures are presented 
in Table 11. The correlations between the two sets of 
measures for the full sample are repeated for reference. 
Given the very small sample of Per-Mags, the differences in 
the two sets of values are difficult to Interpret. That is, 
both the more unusual behavior to be expected of Per-Mags, 
and sampling variation due to a small n are plausible, but 
competing, explanations.
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Table 11.
Correlations between the Chapman Scales and the Response Set 
Measures for Per-Mags ._______________________________________________
Edward's SD M-C SD Welsh's R Jackson's Inf.
P e r . Ab. -.08 -.49 .42 -.28
Mag. Id. -.03 -.31 -.12 .32
Phy. An. -.28 -.16 -.36 .20
Imp. Non. .02 -.03 -.28 .43
(N = 14)
Correlations 
Measures for
between
entire
the Chapman Scales and the 
sample.
Response Set
Edward's SD M-C SD Welsh's R Jackson's
In f .
Per. Ab. -.359 -.067 -.193 .279
Mag. Id. -.428 -.081 -.292 .242
Phy. An. -.118 -.083 .038 .110
Imp. Non. -.382 -.098 -.300 .195
(N = 228)
Discussion
The first major finding of the study was that the means 
for the Edwards1 and Marlowe-Crowne social desirability 
scales were significantly lower than the means reported in 
the 1 9 6 0 's. As the present sample was relatively large (N = 
228), it is unlikely that this finding is the result of a 
sampling error or selection bias. Rather, it appears that 
social desirability norms are less stringent than they once 
w e r e .
In addition, the mean score for Jackson's infrequency 
Scale was significantly lower than originally reported in 
1967. This may suggest a trend toward more sophisticated 
approaches to psychological tests by college populations. 
It may also reflect the fact that much of the present study 
was done in small groups with greater control over random or 
inattentive responding.
The normative data obtained for the Perceptual 
Aberration and Impulsive Nonconformity Scales was consistent 
with the norms obtained by Chapman and his colleagues. On 
the Magical Ideation Scale, however, the mean from the 
present Montana sample was slightly, though significantly 
higher than the Wisconsin sample mean obtained by Chapman 
and Eckblad (1983). The mean for the Physical Anhedonia 
Scale is also significantly higher than Chapman's value, and 
may be large enough to be of practical significance (6 point
50
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difference for men, 4 point difference for women). This 
suggests the need for further collection of normative data 
reflecting possible geographical variation in responding on 
these scales.
The response set measures identified by the stepwise 
regression analysis as the strongest predictors for the 
Magical Ideation and Impulsive Nonconformity Scales were the 
Edwards Social Desirability Scale and Welsh's R Scale. 
These results were highly significant, accounting for 
approximately 25 percent of the total variance in these 
scales, and indicate that these two response sets are 
influencing scores on the Magical Ideation and Impulsive 
Nonconformity Scales in a substantial way.
The Edwards is again the strongest predictor for the 
Perceptual Aberration Scale. The Edwards SD Scale and 
Jackson's Infrequency Scale together accounted for 17.6 
percent of the variance.
Interestingly, none of the response set measures was 
found to be a reliable predictor of scores on the Physical 
Anhedonia Scale, and correlations between the Physical 
Anhedonia Scale and the response set measures were uniformly 
low (Table 6). One can begin to see the reason for this by 
inspecting items in the scale. For example, there is a
balance in the true-false keying of the scale (31 items 
keyed 'true', 30 items keyed 'false') a characteristic which
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has been recommended to reduce the unwanted influence of 
acquiescent response sets. Secondly, it is not unreason­
able to consider that admitting one cares little for a 
variety of physical stimuli is less socially undesirable 
than admitting to the experience of unusual perceptual 
experiences, believing in magic, or to thinking oneself to 
be an impulsive and defiant person.
For example, one item on the Physical Anhedonia Scale 
is "Sex is the most intensely enjoyable thing in life." The 
answer to this item clearly depends on the subject's 
personal values, and we can easily imagine an individual 
responding yes or no, and therefore we can reasonably 
expect variability in responses. Thus, societal agreement 
regarding the social desirablility of signs and symptoms of 
physical anhedonia is probably low, and we would look for 
little influence from tendencies to respond in the socially 
desirable direction.
Another important finding in this research was that the 
set of predictor variables selected from the stepwise 
regression procedure was strongly influenced by the sample. 
Correspondingly, cross validation of the prediction equa­
tions often resulted in a tremendous amount of shrinkage 
indicating these relationships are unstable and highly 
dependent on the sample. Given that the response set 
measures used are very reliable scales, it is possible that
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validation experiments for the Chapman scales have been 
consistently capitalizing on chance, as cross validation 
procedures are seldom reported. Thus, a few individuals in 
any sample indicating bizarre symptoms generally associated 
with schizotypal personality disorder may account for the 
magnitude of the correlations they report, and also for the 
lack of replication of his results.
The analysis of the faking conditions demonstrates that 
normal subjects were able to successfully fake their re­
sponses in either direction on each of the Chapman scales. 
The means for the Chapman measures are low under standand 
instructions, a fact which by itself suggests that social 
desirablility for these scales is not adequately controlled. 
While the ranges of the scores on the Chapman scales under 
faking Instructions indicated that occasional individuals 
reversed the faking task, normal subjects were, in general, 
able to see the structure of the scales clearly enough to be 
able to create a good or bad impression as desired for each 
of the Chapman measures.
Using Chapman's criteria, 14 Per-Mags were identified 
in our sample. Mote that such a small number is to be 
expected given the selection criteria for Per-Mags. Per- 
mags in our sample were able to significantly lower their 
score when faking good on the Perceptual Aberration and 
Magical Ideation Scales, and significantly raise their
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scores when faking bad on the Physical Anhedonia and 
Impulsive Nonconformity Scales. They were not able to 
significantly alter their scores in other situations. Thus, 
it appears that the Per-Mag group was not able to alter 
their Impressions to the same extent as the normal group. 
However, it is difficult to determine if this was a result 
of initially low mean values (even when they altered their 
scores successfully the means were still greater than the 
average values for the scales), of the small sample (in 
which case the event of an individual reversing the faking 
task would produce tremendous shifts in the mean values), or 
whether these individuals were themselves unable to fake 
effectively.
In conclusion, it is extremely important to develop 
personality scales that are relatively free from response 
biases to ensure that the scales are not simply measuring 
personal sets to respond to content-irrelevant aspects of 
the test. While Chapman et al. claim that the potential 
artifacts of social desirability, acquiescence, and random 
responding were considered, and thereby accounted for, in 
their psychosls-pronesness measures, the inconsistent manner 
with which response biases were measured made evaluation of 
this claim quite difficult. Closer, more systematic 
inspection reveals that the problems of response biases were 
not fully addressed.
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Chapman et al. address the possibility o£ Marlowe- 
Crowne social desirability response bias in the descriptions 
of their scales. However, they neglect to deal with the 
problems associated with Edwards social desirability which 
is the major source of response bias in personality meas­
urement. This is reflected in the fact that the Edwards SD 
Scale was found to be the strongest predictor for the 
Perceptual Aberration, Magical Ideation, and Impulsive 
Nonconformity Scales, and the fact that normal subjects were 
able to fake their responses either direction on each of the 
Chapman measures.
If we wish to distinguish between the traits of per­
ceptual abberation, magical ideation, impulsive noncomform- 
ity, and physical anhedonia, then it is necessary to develop 
scales which are relatively uncorrelated with scores on both 
Edwards and Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scales. In 
addition, since scores on personality scales are regarded as 
being susceptible to the influence of acquiescent tendencies 
to the degree to which there is an imbalance in the true- 
false keying of the Items, an attempt to balance the keying 
of the Chapman scales, (a relatively simple task), would 
result in a diminished influence of acquiescence response 
sets. These problems must be adequately addressed before 
reasonable interpretations of the Chapman scales can be 
made. Additionally, the faking analysis should be
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replicated with a larger Per-Mag sample to determine the 
extent- to which individuals identified as psychosis prone 
can fake their responses on the Chapman measures.
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Appendix A
Edvards social Desirability Scale
Read each statement and decide whether it is "true” as
applied to you, or "false" as applied to you. Indicate your
answer by circling the T or F. Be sure to answer every
question.
1. My hands and feet are usually warm enough. (T)
2. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job. (F)
3. Most of the time I would rather sit and daydream than do
anything else. (F)
4. My sleep is fitful and disturbed. (F)
5. My family does not like the work I have chosen (or the
work I intend to choose for my life work). (F)
6. I am happy most of the time. (T)
7. I am very seldom troubled by constipation. (T)
8. I am liked by most people who know me. (T)
9. I cry easily. (F)
10. I do not tire quickly. (T)
11. I. frequently notice my hand shakes when I try to do
something. (F)
12. Criticism or scolding hurts me terribly. (F)
13. It makes me impatient to have people ask my advice or 
otherwise interrupt me when I am working on something 
important. (F)
14. I dream frequently about things that are best kept to 
myself. (F)
15. I sweat very easily even on cool days. (F)
16. I have had periods in which I carried on activities
wiithout knowing later what I had been doing. (F)
17. It makes me uncomfortable to put on a stunt at a party 
even when others are doing the same sort of thing. (F)
18. I am not afraid to handle money. (T)
19. Life is a strain for me much of the time. (F)
20. I am easily embarrassed. (F)
21. I cannot keep my mind on one thing. (F)
22. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the 
right thing to talk about. (F)
23. I feel anxiety about someone or something almost all of 
the time. (F)
24. I have been afraid of things or people that I knew could 
not hurt me. (F)
25. I am not usually self-conscious. (T)
26. It does not bother me particularly to see animals 
suffer. (F)
27. My parents and family find more fault with me than they 
should. (F)
28. I feel hungry almost all the time. (F)
29. I worry quite a bit about possible misfortunes. (F)
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30. No one cares much what happens to you. (F)
31. It makes me nervous to have to wait. (F)
32. I usually expect to succed in the things I do. (T)
33. I can easily make other people afraid of me, and
sometimes do so for the fun of it. (F)
34. I blush no more often than others. (T)
35. I am never happier than when alone. (F)
36. I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty. (F)
37. I sometimes feel that I'm about to go to pieces. (F)
38. I have reason for feeling jealous of one or more members
of my family. (F)
39. People often disappoint me. (F)
Appendix b
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
Listed below are a number o£ statements concerning
personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide
whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you
personally.
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifica­
tions of all the candidates. (T)
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in 
trouble. (T)
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I 
am not encouraged. (F)
4. I have never Intensely disliked anyone. (T)
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to
succeed in life. (F)
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. (F)
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. (T)
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out
in a restaurant. (T)
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I 
was not seen, I would probably do it. (F)
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something 
because I thought too little of my ability. (F)
11. I like to gossip at times. (F)
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against 
people in authority even though I knew they were right. 
(F)
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good 
listener. (T)
14. I can remember playing sick to get out of something. (F)
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of 
someone. (F)
16. I'm always willing to admit when I've made a mistake.
(T)
17. I always try to practice what I preach. (T)
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with 
loud mouthed, obnoxious people. (T)
19. I sometimes try to get even, rather that forgive and 
forget. (F)
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind 
admitting it. (T)
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagree­
able. (T)
22. At times I have really Insisted on having things my own 
way. (F)
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing 
things. (F)
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished
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for my wrongdoings. (T)
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor. (T)
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very
different from my own. (T)
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of 
my car. (T)
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the 
good fortune of others. (F)
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 
(F)
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
(F)
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause. (T)
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they
only got what they deserved. (F)
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt 
someone's feelings. (T)
Appendix c
Jackson's Infrequency scale
1. My musical compositions have been played in concert 
halls around the world. (T)
2. I have sight in only one eye. (T)
3. I have no sense of taste at all. (T)
4. I have kept a pet monkey for years. (T)
5. I have won trophies in professional golf tournaments.
(T)
6. I run five miles every day to keep healthy (T)
7. I eat imported cheeses with all my meals. (T)
8. I have made several trips overseas to study old ruins 
and rock formations.
9. Everyone in my family has the same birthday. (T)
10. All jokes seem pointless to me. (T)
11. of the people I know, I like some better than others.
(F)
12. I have had at least one cold in my life. (F)
13. I have sometimes hesitated before making a decision. (F)
14. In my lifetime, I have eaten at least one meal in a 
restaurant. (F)
15. Some things don't turn out exactly as I plan them. (F)
16. I can eat most foods without feeling ill. (F)
17. I do somethings better than others. (F)
18. I believe there are some jobs I would not enjoy doing.
(F)
19. I can walk a few blocks without getting tired. (F)
20. I usually sleep at least four hours every night. (F)
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Welsh's R Scale
1. I like mechanics magazines. (F)
2. I like to read newspaper articles on crime. (F)
3. I am about as able to work as I ever was. (F)
4. I enjoy detective or mystery stories. (F)
5. At times I feel like smashing things. (F)
6. I am in just as good physical health as most of my
friends. (F)
7. I think I would like the kind of work a forest ranger 
does. (F)
8. I frequently find it nescessary to stand up for what I 
think is right. (F)
9. I like dramatics. (F)
10. I do not worry about catching diseases. (F)
11. I like to cook. (F)
12. At times I feel like picking a fist fight with someone.
(F)
13. I have never had a fit or convulsion. (F)
14. I have had periods in which I carried on activities
without knowing later what I had been doing. (F)
15. Sometimes, when embarrassed, I break out in a sweat
which annoys me greatly. (F)
16. I like to flirt. (F)
17. I think I would like the work of a building contractor.
(F)
18. I like science. (F)
19. I do not blame a person for taking advantage of someone
who lays himself open to it. (F)
20. At times I am all full of energy. (F)
21. I do not often notice my ears ringing or buzzing. (F)
22. Once in a while I feel hate towards members of my family 
whom I usually love. (F)
23. My mother or father often made me obey even when I 
thought it was unreasonable. (F)
24. I have often met people who were supposed to be experts 
who were no better than I. (F)
25. If given the chance I would make a good leader of 
people. (F)
26. I like to attend lectures on serious subjects. (F)
27. I try to remember good stories to pass them on to other
people. (F)
28. I was fond of excitement when I was young (or in 
childhood). (F)
29. I am often inclined to go out of my way to win a point 
with someone who has opposed me. (F)
30. I enjoy social gatherings just to be with people. (F)
31. I enjoy the excitement of a crowd. (F)
32. My worries seem to disappear when I get into a crown of
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lively friends. (F)
33. I have had no difficulty starting or holding my urine. 
(F)
34. I am often sorry because I am so cross and grouchy. (F)
35. I am fascinated by fire. (F)
36. I like to let people know where I stand on things. (F)
37. Some of my family have quick tempers. (F)
38. I would like to wear expensive clothes. (F)
39. I like repairing a door latch. (F)
40. I am very careful about my manner of dress. (F)
Appendix E
Faking Instructions
The following items are from a scale designed to meas­
ure magical ideation. This includes believing in a number 
of magical influences such as the transfer of psychical 
energies between people, psychokinetic effects, precogni­
tion, astrology, reincarnation, and good luck charms. 
Please try to answer these items in such a way as to give 
the impression that magical ideation (does not) affect(s) 
your thinking.
The following items are from a scale designed to meas­
ure impulsive nonconformity. This includes lacking self- 
control, difficulty delaying gratification, episodes of un­
controlled rage, lacking concern for the rights of others, 
and lacking respect for the social and ethical standards of 
society. Please try to answer these items in such a way as 
to give the impression that impulsive nonconformity (does 
not) affect(s) your thinking.
The following items are from a scale designed to meas­
ure perceptual aberration. This Includes perceiving alter­
ations in the size and shape of one's body, and feeling as 
though one is merging with external objects. Please try to 
answer these items in such a way as to give the impression 
that perceptual abberation (does not) affect(s) your think­
ing.
The following items are from a scale designed to mea­
sure physical anhedonia. This includes a lowered ability 
to experience physical pleasures such as eating, touching, 
movement, smelling and hearing. Please try to answer these 
items in such a way as to give the impression that physical 
anhedonia (does not) affect(s) your thinking.
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The Chapman Scales
Perceptual Aberration Scale
3. Sometimes I have had feeling that I am united with an
object near me. (T)
7. Sometimes when I look at things like tables and chairs,
they seem strange. (T)
9. Sometimes I feel like everything around me is tilting.
(T)
17. I can remember when it seemed as though one of my limbs 
took on an unusual shape. (T)
26. I have felt that my body and another person's body were 
one and the same. (T)
32. Parts of my body occasionally seem dead or unreal. (T)
35. Sometimes people whom I know well begin to look like
strangers. (T)
40. I have sometimes had the feeling that one of my arms or
legs was disconnected from the rest of my body. (T)
46. It has seemed at times as if my body was melting into 
my surroundings. (T)
54. I have felt as though my head or limbs were somehow not 
my o w n . (T )
58. Now and then when I look in the mirror, my face seems 
quite different than usual. (T)
61. Often I have a day when indoor lights seem so bright
that they bother my eyes. (T)
64. I have sometimes had the feeling that my body is
decaying inside. (T)
67. I have sometimes felt that some part of my body no
longer belonged to me. (T)
80. I sometimes have to touch myself to make sure I'm still
there. (T)
83. I have sometimes felt confused as to whether my body
was really my own. (T)
88. I have felt that something outside my body was a part
of my body. (T)
92. Sometimes I have had the feeling that a part of my body
is larger than it usually is. (T)
95. For several days at a time I have had such a heightened 
awareness of sights and sounds that I cannot shut them 
out. (T)
96. At times I have wondered if my body was really my own. 
(T)
99. I sometimes have had the feeling that some parts of my
body are not attached to the same person. (T)
102. My hearing is sometimes so sensitive that ordinariy
sounds become uncomfortable. (T)
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107. Occasionallly I have felt as though my body did not 
exist. (T)
111. Occasionally it has seemed as if my body had taken on 
the appearance of another person's body. (T)
120. I have had the momentary feeling that my body has 
become misshapen. (T)
124. Sometines I have had a passing thought that some part 
of my body was rotting away. (T)
128. I sometimes have had the feeling that my body is 
abnormal. (T)
130. I have had the momentary feeling that the things I 
touch remain attached to my body. (T)
132. Ordinary colors sometimes seem much too bright to me 
(without taking drugs). (T)
133. Sometimes part of my body has seemed smaller than it 
usually is. (T)
136. Sometimes I have felt that I could not distingulesh my 
body from other objects aroound me. (T)
42. My hands or feet have never seemed far away. (F)
51. I have never had the passing feeling that my arms or
legs had become longer than usual. (F)
85. The boundaries of my body always seem clear. (F)
104. I have never felt that my arms or legs have momentarily
grown in size. (F)
Magical ideation Scale
5. I sometimes have a feeling of gaining or losing energy
when certain people look at me or touch me. (T)
14. I have sometimes been fearful of stepping on sidewalk
cracks. (T)
20. I have wondered whether the spirits of the dead can
influence the living. (T)
23. Things sometimes seem to be in different places when I 
get home, even though no one has been there. (T)
24. I think I could learn to read other's minds if I wanted 
to. (T)
28. At times I perform certain little rituals to ward off 
negative influences. (T)
29. I have felt that I might cause something to happen just 
by thinking too much about it. (T)
34. I have occasionally had the silly feeling that a TV or
radio broadcaster knew I was listening to him. (T)
39. I have sometimes felt that strangers were reading my
mind. (T)
49. Some people can make me aware of them just by thinking
about me. (T)
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50. I have worried that people on other planets may be 
influencing what happens on earth. (T)
53. The hand motions that strangers make seem to influence 
me at times. (T)
57. People often behave so strangely that one wonders if 
they are part of an experiment. (T)
66. I have had the momentary feeling that someones's place 
has been taken by a look-alike. (T)
69. I have felt that there were messages for me in the way
things were arranged, like in a store window. (T)
77. I have noticed sounds on my records that are not there
at other times. (T)
84. At times I have felt that a professor's lecture was
meant especially for me. (T)
106. I have sometimes had the passing thought that strangers
are in love with me. (T)
109. I have had the momentary feeling that I might not be
human. (T)
113. Horoscopes are right too often to be a coincidence. (T)
138. I have sometimes sensed an evil presence around me, 
although I could not see it. (T)
139. If reincarnation were true, it would explain some 
unusual experiences I have had. (T)
141. The government refuses to tell us the truth about 
flying saucers. (T)
55. Numbers like 13 and 7 have no special powers. (F)
60. I have never had the feeling that certain thoughts of
mine really belonged to someone else. (F)
65. It is not possible to harm others merely by thinking
bad thoughts about them. (F)
71. When introduced to strangers, I rarely wonder whether I
have know them before. (F)
91. I almost never dream about things before they happen.
(F)
116. Good luck charms don't work. (F)
140. I have never doubted that my dreams are the products of
my own mind. (F)
Physical Anhedonia Scale
6. There just are not many things that I have ever really 
enjoyed doing. (T)
8. The sound of rustling leaves has never much pleased me. 
(T)
10. I have always hated the feeling of exhaustion that 
comes from vigorous activity. (T)
12. I don't understand why people enjoy looking at the
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stars at night. (T)
16. The color that things are painted has seldom mattered 
to m e . (T)
22. The sounds of a parade have never excited me. (T)
25. The beauty of sunsets is greatly overrated. (T)
41. Sex is okay, but not as much fun as most people claim
it is. (T)
44. Flowers aren't as beautiful as many people claim. (T)
47. Poets always exaggerate the beauty and joys of nature. 
(T)
52. I usually finish my bath or shower as quickly as
possible just to get it over with. (T)
56. I have seldom cared to sing in the shower. (T)
62. I've never cared much about the texture of food. (T)
72. I never wanted to go on any of the rides at an
amusement park. (T)
75. I have never found a thunderstorm exhilarating^ (T)
79. I never have the desire to take off my shoes and walk
through a puddle barefoot. (T)
89. I think that flying a kite is really silly. (T)
93. I have had very little fun from physical activities
like walking, swimming, or sports. (T)
101. One food tastes as good as another to me. (T)
103. I have had very little desire to try new kinds of 
foods. (T)
105. I have always found organ music dull and unexciting.
(T)
108. I have seldom enjoyed any kind of sexual experience.
(T)
112. I don't know why some people are so interested in 
music. (T)
115. I have usually found soft music boring rather than 
relaxing. (T)
119. The smell of dinner cooking has hardly ever aroused my 
appetite. (T)
121. I have often felt uncomfortable when my friends touch 
m e . (T )
122. Dancing, or the idea of it, has always seemed dull to 
m e . (T )
123. Sunbathing isn't really more fun than lying down 
indoors. (T)
134. The warmth of an open flrepalce hasn't especially 
soothed and calmed me. (T)
135. On hearing a good song I have seldom wanted to sing 
along with it. (T)
142. I've never cared to sunbathe; it just makes me hot. (T)
2. I have sometimes enjoyed feeling the strength of my 
muscles. (F)
Response Bias
73
On seeing a soft, thick, carpet, I have sometimes had 
the impulse to take off my shoes and walk barefoot on 
it. (F)
13. I have been fascinated with the dancing of flames in a 
fireplace. (F)
15. I have often enjoyed receiving a strong, warm 
handshake. (F)
18. The taste of food has always been important to me. (F)
19. I have always loved having my back massaged. (F)
21. The bright lights of the city are exciting to look at.
(F)
27. When I have seen a statue I have had the urge to feel 
it. (F)
31. After a busy day, a slow walk has often felt relaxing. 
(F)
33. I have always had a number of favorite foods. (F)
37. It has always made me feel good when someone I care
about reaches out to touch me. (F)
43. When I have walked by a bakery, the smell of fresh
bread has often made me hungry. (F)
45. It has often felt good to massage my muscles when they
are tired or sore. (F)
63. When I pass by flowers, I have often stopped to smell
them. (F)
68. I like playing with and petting soft little kittens or
puppies. (F)
70. Beautiful scenery has been a great delight to me. (F)
73. I have sometimes danced by myself just to feel my body
move with the music. (F)
74. I have often found walks to be relaxing and enjoyable. 
(F)
82. When eating a favorite food, I have often tried to eat 
slowly to make it last longer. (F)
90. I have usually found lovemaking to be intensely
pleasurable. (F)
94. A good soap lather when I'm bathing has sometimes
soothed and refreshed me. (F)
98. The first winter snowfall has often looked pretty to
m e . (F )
100. When I'm feeling little sad, singing has often made me 
feel happier. (F)
110. Sex is the most intensely enjoyable thing in life. (F)
117. Standing on a high place and looking out over the view 
is very exciting. (F)
125. Trying new foods is something I have always enjoyed. 
(F)
127. The sound of organ music has often thrilled me. (F)
129. The sound of the rain falling on the roof has made me 
feel snug and secure. (F)
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137. I have often enjoyed the feel of silk, velvet, or fur. 
(F)
143. A brisk walk has sometimes made me feel good all over. 
(F)
Impulsive Noncomformity Scale
78. When I start out in the evening, I seldom know what 
I fll end up doing. (T)
144. I often get so mad that I lose track of some of the
things I say. (T)
146. Thinking things over too carefully can destroy half the 
fun of doing them. (T)
148. I usually quit before finishing one activity in order 
to start something else. (T)
149. As often as once a month I have become so angry that I
have had to hit something or someone to relieve my
anger. (T)
150. I frequently overeat and wonder why later. (T)
151. Most people say "please" and "thank you" more often 
than is necessary. (T)
153. When I want something, delays are unbearable. (T)
154. I don't have much sympathy for people whom I can push 
around and manipulate easily. (T)
155. Most of the mourners at funerals are just pretending to 
be sad. (T)
156. My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood by 
others. (T)
157. Most people think of me as reckless. (T)
158. I always let people know how I feel about them, even if 
it hurts them a little. (T)
159. I almost always do what makes me happy now, even at the
expense of some distant goal. (T)
160. I have had to invent some good excuses to get out of
work or taking exams. (T)
161. I think people spend too much time safeguarding their 
future with savings and insurance. (T)
162. I break rules just for the hell of it. (T)
163. I usually find myself doing things "on impulse." (T)
164. I usually act first and ask questions later. (T)
166. I prefer being spontaneous rather than planning ahead. 
(T)
168. I sometimes do dangerous things just for the thrill of 
it. (T)
169. No one seems to understand me. (T)
170. I let go and yell alot when I'm mad. (T)
171. I find it difficult to remain composed when I get into 
an argument. (T)
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172. Long-term goals are not as important for me as living 
for today. (T)
173. During one period when I was a youngster I engaged in 
petty thievery. (T)
175. I often do unusual things just to be different from 
other people. (T)
178. In school I sometimes got in trouble for cutting up.
(T)
180. I like to use obscene language to shock people. (T)
181. People who drive carefully annoy me. (T)
183. I liked to annoy my high school teachers. (T)
184. When I really want something, I don't care how much it 
costs. (T)
186. My parents often objected to the kind of people I went 
around with. (T)
187. I would probably purchase stolen merchandise if I knew 
it was safe. (T)
189. I do many things that seem strange to others but don't 
seem strange to me. (T)
190. I wouldn't worry if my bills were overdue. (T)
192. I usually laugh out loud at clumsy people. (T)
87. It worries me if I know there are mistakes in my work.
(F)
145. I never get so angry that I can't speak coherently. (F)
147. It's important to save money. (F)
152. My friends consider me a cool and controlled person.
(F)
165. I rarely act on impulse. (F)
167. I always stop at red lights. (F)
176. I usually consider different viewpoints before making a
decision. (F)
179. Being in debt would worry me. (F)
182. If I burped loudly while having dinner at the house of 
someone I knew, I would be embarrrassed. (F)
188. I have never been in trouble with the law. (F)
191. I try to remember to send people birthday cards. (F)
194. I avoid trouble whenever I can. (F)
195. It would embarrass me a lot to have to spend a night in 
jail. (F)
198. I usually control my feelings well. (F)
Appendix G
Correlations
Table 5 Extended.
Correlations between the Perceptual Abberation Scale (Per. 
Ab.), the Magical Ideation Scale (Mag. Id.), the Physical 
Anhedonia Scale (Phy. An.), and the Impulsive Nonconformity 
Scale (Imp. N o n . ) .___________________________________________________
M a g . 
Phy. 
I m p .
Id. 
An. 
N o n .
Per. Ab.
.688
-.174
.349
Mag. Id.
-.175
.348
Phy. An. 
.227
(N = 223, 5 observations deleted)*
Per. Ab. Mag. Id. Phy. An.
Mag. Id. .689
Phy. An. -.175 -.178
Imp. N o n . .349 .352 .228
(N = 221, 7 observations deleted)*
Per. Ab. Mag. Id. Phy. An.
Mag. Id. .677
Phy. An. -.167 -.166
Imp. Non. .386 .373 .218
(N = 222, 6 observations deleted)*
Per. Ab. Mag. Id. Phy. An.
Mag. Id. .679
Phy. An. -.167 -.174
Imp. Non. .330 .339 .230
(N = 222, 6 observations deleted)*
* Deletion was on the basis of a standardized residual 
greater than 3.0, or on a single observation accounting for 
more that 2% of the variance in the dependent measure.
76
